Civil asset forfeiture (United States, 1984 to 2026)

Federal and state law lets agencies seize property tied to crime without a conviction, and a federal fund took in $2.287 billion in fiscal 2025; courts and legislatures have tightened some rules while law enforcement and reform groups still disagree about incentives, innocent owners and who must prove what.

The record

What civil forfeiture is

• In civil (in rem) forfeiture the government sues the property, not the owner. Property can be forfeited even when its owner was never charged. Criminal forfeiture, by contrast, follows a conviction of the owner. Justice Thomas described the civil form in 2017 as proceedings that can end in forfeiture "even when the owner is personally innocent," while noting that some statutes, including Texas's, provide an innocent-owner defense. (Leonard v. Texas, statement respecting denial of certiorari, March 6, 2017; opened)
• Federal law runs mainly through 18 U.S.C. 983, added by the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-185, enacted April 25, 2000). The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that property is subject to forfeiture, and for property used in a crime must show "a substantial connection between the property and the offense." Claimants who say they are innocent owners must prove that defense by a preponderance. Notice of a non-judicial forfeiture is due within 60 days of seizure (90 days when state or local police hand a seizure to federal agencies). A claimant files a sworn claim with no bond, and the government generally has 90 days to file a complaint. A court may appoint counsel for a financially unable claimant who already has appointed counsel in a related criminal case, and for a primary residence must ensure representation by a Legal Services Corporation attorney. A claimant can seek release of seized property for substantial hardship, with exclusions for contraband, currency and evidence. (18 U.S.C. 983, Cornell LII; Public Law 106-185, GovInfo; both opened)
• Public Law 106-185 section 2 has no statement of congressional findings, so we cannot quote a stated purpose from the enacted text. (GovInfo; opened)

Money: the federal Assets Forfeiture Fund

The Justice Department posts total receipts and expenses of its Assets Forfeiture Fund. The page was updated February 11, 2026. Figures are in millions of dollars.

Source: DOJ, Assets Forfeiture Fund total receipts and expenses; opened. The page lists a ten-year average of 2,001. Its text says "billion" while the table says millions; the table's own figures fit millions. The page says deposits and expenses "generally mirror each other." These are fund totals for the federal program only. They do not say how much came from civil versus criminal cases, how much went to people who were never charged, or how much state programs took in. The fund also includes deposits from very large cases, which may explain the 2023 peak (the page does not say).

Equitable sharing: how federal and local forfeiture connect

• Equitable sharing lets federal agencies share forfeited property with state and local agencies that helped. In an "adoption," a local agency seizes property and asks a federal agency to take it over; the request is due within 30 days of seizure. In joint cases, shares track each agency's work. In the DOJ guide we opened, the federal share is generally 20 percent of net proceeds when a local agency did all the pre-seizure work, and shared funds must supplement and not replace budgets. That guide is undated in our copy (it points to a 2008 policy manual and a 1984 start), so current percentages should be checked. (DOJ equitable sharing guide, mirrored by U.S. Attorney's Office, Rhode Island; opened)
• Attorney General Eric Holder's January 2015 order barred most federal adoptions of local seizures. Attorney General Jeff Sessions reinstated adoptions with some restrictions in July 2017. According to the Institute for Justice (an advocacy group), adoptions fell from 26 percent of equitable-sharing forfeitures in 2014 to 5 percent in 2016, and have stayed near 10 percent since 2019. (Institute for Justice, Policing for Profit 4, equitable sharing chapter; opened; we did not open the Holder or Sessions orders themselves)
• The National Sheriffs' Association opposed the 2015 order, saying it weakens local ability to fight drug crime, shifts costs to local governments and ends a tool that has run about 30 years. (National Sheriffs' Association release, Jan. 26, 2015; opened)

Court record

| Date | Case | What it held or said | Source | |---|---|---| | Mar. 6, 2017 | Leonard v. Texas (cert. denied) | Thomas wrote alone to question whether "modern civil-forfeiture statutes can be squared with the Due Process Clause and our Nation's history." The Court took no action on the merits. Texas courts had affirmed forfeiture of $201,100 found in a safe in a car on a traffic stop, finding it likely drug money. | Cornell LII text; opened | | Feb. 2019 | Timbs v. Indiana | Unanimous in the result: the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states. A trial court had found forfeiture of a roughly $42,000 vehicle grossly disproportionate to a $10,000 maximum fine. Justice Ginsburg wrote for eight justices, Thomas concurred in the judgment. The Court did not revisit Austin v. United States (civil forfeiture is covered by the Clause when at least partly punitive). | Cornell LII text; opened | | May 2024 | Culley v. Marshall | 6 to 3 (Kavanaugh): due process requires a timely forfeiture hearing but not a separate preliminary (retention) hearing for seized cars. Two Alabama car owners had lent vehicles to others who were arrested; the state filed forfeiture complaints 10 and 13 days after seizure. Gorsuch (with Thomas) agreed but wrote that modern practice and its financial incentives raise questions. Sotomayor (with Kagan and Jackson) dissented. | Cornell LII text; opened |

(The exact decision dates of Timbs and Culley are not shown in the text we read; we left them as month or approximate. Check the U.S. Reports.)

State law

• Four states are described by the Institute for Justice as having ended civil forfeiture in favor of criminal forfeiture: New Mexico, Nebraska, North Carolina and Maine. Maine's repeal (LD 1521) took effect in July 2021 without the governor's signature, allows forfeiture without conviction only in narrow cases (death, deportation, flight or abandonment), creates a prompt post-seizure hearing, requires public reporting, and limits use of equitable sharing to seizures of $100,000 or more in cash. IJ reports Maine agencies collected over $14 million through equitable sharing over two decades against just over $3 million forfeited under state law from 2009 to 2019. (Institute for Justice, July 13, 2021; opened)
• New Mexico's HB 560 passed the Senate 37 to 0 in March 2015 and would require conviction and send proceeds to the general fund instead of police budgets. (Jurist, March 2015; opened; the article does not report the governor's signature)
• Institute for Justice reports across 24 states that half of currency forfeitures were worth less than $1,678, against an estimated attorney cost near $3,300; that 71 percent of DOJ forfeitures were administrative (no court hearing); and that in three states with data, 62 to 76 percent of seizures were forfeited by default. (Institute for Justice, Policing for Profit 4, March 24, 2026; opened summary page only; advocacy source)

What this case shows

1. Many owners cannot afford to ask a court. If half of cash forfeitures are under about $1,700 and a lawyer costs about twice that, the process may be too costly to use, which would leave small owners with a right they cannot exercise. The numbers come from an advocacy group's data and should be read as claims to be checked against state records. (IJ, 2026)
2. The money is public but hard to follow. DOJ posts fund totals, but the page does not say how much came from cases with no conviction. Maine had to pass a law to require public reports, which suggests that the state-level picture was not easy to see. (DOJ; IJ 2021)
3. Voters in several states changed the rules. New Mexico passed its bill 37 to 0 in the Senate, and Maine's repeal passed as a bipartisan bill. The topic has produced votes across party lines. We do not score any party. (Jurist; IJ 2021)
4. Courts have set limits, narrowly. Timbs applies the Excessive Fines Clause to states, and Culley leaves states free to adopt retention hearings. Both rulings turned on the Constitution, not on the policy question of whether forfeiture should be civil at all. (Cornell LII)
5. Incentives are named by justices on different sides. Thomas (2017) and Gorsuch (2024) both pointed to financial incentives and to the poor bearing the heaviest burden, while Sotomayor's dissent in Culley named seizures held for long periods. The majority in Culley did not decide the incentive question. (Cornell LII)

The strongest objections, and our answers

1. Objection: Forfeiture takes the profits and tools of drug trafficking and funds enforcement. The National Sheriffs' Association says forfeiture revenue pays for equipment, training and officer safety and that a few isolated abuses should not end a 30-year program. Mitigation: We state this position in full. Evidence on how often forfeiture reduces crime is not in the sources we opened, so we make no claim either way.
2. Objection: CAFRA and state laws already protect innocent owners. The 2000 Act put the burden of proof on the government, allows hardship release, and has an innocent-owner defense. Mitigation: These are real changes, and we quote them. Whether claimants can use them is the open question: the owner still has the burden on the innocent-owner defense, and the numbers on default and administrative forfeiture come from an advocacy group.
3. Objection: The reform figures come from the Institute for Justice, which litigates against forfeiture. Mitigation: We label the source, use DOJ and court texts for core facts, and mark IJ numbers as secondary. A Heritage Foundation piece (2017) also argues for reform; we opened only that one non-IJ reform source and do not rely on it for numbers.
4. Objection: The DOJ fund total is not "forfeitures of innocent people." Mitigation: Correct. The fund includes proceeds from convictions and large criminal cases. We say so. The figure shows scale and public posting, not the number or share of owners who were never charged.
5. Objection: Culley shows the Court sees no due process problem. Mitigation: The Court held that a separate preliminary hearing is not required. It did not say current practice is ideal, and three justices dissented while two concurring justices raised doubts.

Open questions: what would change our minds

• What share of federal and state forfeitures occur without any conviction or charge? We found no official figure. The DOJ page gives totals only.
• Do equitable-sharing percentages in the current DOJ policy manual match the undated guide we opened? Not checked.
• The Holder (January 2015) and Sessions (July 2017) orders were not opened; the description comes from the Institute for Justice.
• The pre-2000 burden of proof and the history of forfeiture before 1984 were not opened.
• New Mexico's signing date, and the Nebraska and North Carolina laws, were not opened. Their inclusion rests on one advocacy press release.
• Whether forfeiture reduces drug crime: evidence from law-enforcement and academic studies not reviewed.
• Exact decision dates for Timbs and Culley: confirm in the U.S. Reports.
• State-by-state numbers for 2025 and 2026: only the IJ summary page was opened, not the report tables.

Sources

Evidence status and correction history

Key claims

Correction history

Found an error or a better source? We keep every correction on the record with its date and reason. Nothing here is quietly rewritten.